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Thousands of employers throughout the United States' have a so-
called "no-rehire" rule, which usually means that if an employee is
discharged, she is ineligible to reapply for employment at a later date.
Such no-rehire rules serve several purposes. For example, they give teeth
to an employer's rules and regulations, thereby increasing compliance.
They can increase employee loyalty.2 They prevent employees from
repeating misconduct that led to the initial discharge. They reduce the
chance of liability based on the negligent rehiring of someone with known
past problems, such as a propensity for violence.3 But are such rules
necessary to businesses? Are no-rehire rules good human resource
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1. Oral Argument of Carter G. Phillips on Behalf of Petitioner at 3, Raytheon Co. v.
Hernandez, 549 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749).
2. The theory is that if you leave for a competitor, and you cannot plan on coming
back, an employee would be less likely to shop around for better job offers. Often
employers seek to discourage employees from quitting by making known that there is a no-
rehire policy and that going to work elsewhere contravenes the code of loyalty. See Michael
S. Hopkins, What Should You Say When an Employee Quits?, INC., Mar. 1, 1998, at 54
(reporting an interview with Michael Bloomberg in which it is revealed that Bloomberg,
Inc. has a formal no-rehire policy to encourage loyalty); Frederick C. Klein, Former
Employees - Back to the Fold?, MGMT. REV., Jan. 1969, at 46 (noting that policies against
rehire make it less attractive to quit).
3. Should You Rehire - And If So, When and How?, HR BRIEFING (ASPEN), July 15,
2002, at 5 (noting that case by case rehiring decision making is also an acceptable practice,
that information gleaned from exit interviews can be valuable in terms of keeping simple
records regarding eligibility for rehire, that in some respects rehiring former employees
permits them to hit the ground running, and that last chance agreements may be used to set
up special terms for rehiring questionable ex-employees).
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policies. Are simplicity, ease, and consistency of application the primary
merit of no-rehire rules?
Although such no-rehire rules generally apply regardless of the reason
for termination, and are thus facially non-discriminatory, they may have the
potential to screen out certain classes of protected individuals and thereby
violate federal anti-discrimination laws. Envision a pregnant woman who
is discharged because of her fleeting inability to perform the functions of
her job due to her pregnancy, or a person with Tourettes syndrome who is
discharged for uncontrollable swearing. Finally, consider a person with
alcoholism who is discharged for arriving at work intoxicated. Imagine
then that the woman gives birth; the person with Tourettes controls this
neurological condition with a newly available medication; and the alcohol-
addicted individual successfully participates in an Alcoholics Anonymous
program and remains alcohol-free for years. Applying a blanket no-rehire
rule in the above hypothetical situations would prevent reapplication by
qualified and experienced individuals who are no longer subject to the
condition that led to the discharge.' Where no-rehire rules are applied
4. The management wisdom of no-rehire rules is subject to question in that "alumni"
are known quantities, it costs half as much to rehire an ex-employee as it does a new person,
rehires are forty percent more productive in their first quarter at work, and they tend to stay
in the job longer. Cem Sertoglu & Anne Berkowitch, Cultivating Ex-Employees, HARV.
Bus. REv., June 2002, at 20. One survey found that ninety percent of executives would
"roll out the welcome mat for a valued former employee who left in good standing."
Randall Poe & Coral Lee Courter, Fast Forward, Welcome Prodigals, ACROSS THE BOARD,
Oct. 2000, at 5. Some employers prefer to leave the door open for the rehire of ex-
employees but only for employees who leave on good terms and may have new experiences
and skills that provide some added value. See Tiffini Theisen, Here Come the Boomerangs;
Some People Can Make a Career of Returning to Work, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, May
15, 2000, at C-1 ("If employees leave in good standing, with positive work relationships,
they can return with new experiences, a fresh perspective, new skills and perhaps even a
renewed appreciation of the company they are returning to."); Deidra-Ann Parrish, On the
Rebound, BLACK ENTERPRISE, May 1997, at 30 (noting that, although rehiring former
employees has its perks and the percentage of rehires jumped from eighteen percent in 1995
to twenty-four percent in 1996, "you want to steer clear of employees who were fired").
5. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000),
and the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2000), currently
prohibit such discharges, but in accordance with the pertinent statutes, each requires a
threshold number of employees for coverage. The PDA, as an amendment to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires an employer to have fifteen employees to qualify as an
"employer," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b), and in order for FMLA's protections to apply, an
employer must have fifty employees, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(a)(i) (2000) (defining
"employer"). See generally Amy Stutzke, Note, Reinstatement Claims Under the Family
and Medical Leave Act of 1993: Leaving Behind the Inter-Circuit Chaos and Instating a
Suitable Proof Structure, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 577, 579-85 (2003) (discussing overview
and purpose of FMLA). The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) provides protection
from workplace discrimination for individuals who suffer a major life impairment and
qualify as disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. In order to be a "covered entity" and
thereby subject to the provisions of the ADA, an employer must have at least fifteen
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uniformly, they leave no room for an individualized inquiry regarding the
current qualifications and employability of former employees.
The theory behind anti-discrimination legislation is to prevent such
unfair outcomes for individuals who are members of protected classes.
This is true even where the questioned employer policies are facially
neutral, provided that (1) it can be shown that the facially neutral policies
have a "disparate impact" on members of protected groups, and (2) the
policies cannot be justified by business necessity.6 This paper analyzes the
issues involved in disparate impact claims 7 regarding no-rehire rules, and it
includes a discussion and analysis of the United States Supreme Court's
recent decision regarding Raytheon's no-rehire rule.
8
The Raytheon Court, for procedural reasons, alluded to but could not
reach the issue of disparate impact, instead deciding the case based on the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting approach utilized in disparate
treatment cases. 9 So the question remains: do the no-rehire policies that
many of America's employers currently maintain tend to unfairly screen
out - that is, do they have a disparate impact on - alcoholics or other
former addicts in violation of the ADA?1° The answer to this question
depends on several issues that will be explored. Are alcoholics and former
drug abusers even considered "disabled" under the ADA? Where
misconduct is the proffered explanation for termination, should alcoholics
and former drug abusers be given more leeway if the misconduct is caused
employees. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5) (2000).
6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7. Disparate impact claims are distinguishable from "disparate treatment" claims in
that the latter involve claims of intentional discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)
(including codification of disparate impact claims).
8. Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) remanded to 362 F.3d 564 (9th Cir.
2004).
9. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this approach,
plaintiff is required to first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then
shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its
employment action. If the employer meets this burden, the presumption of intentional
discrimination disappears, but the plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by putting
forth evidence demonstrating that the employer's explanation is pretextual. Raytheon, 540
U.S. at 44. As will be discussed, the Court noted in passing that disparate impact claims are
"cognizable" under the ADA. Id. at 53.
10. The question remains whether facially neutral no-rehire rules "must be modified to
accommodate persons who are actually disabled under the ADA" or those who have
recovered but have a record of disability under the ADA. Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Latest
Workplace Litigation a Mixed Bag; For Employers, the Year's Key U.S. Decisions and
Settlements Include Some Big Wins, Losses, Bus. INSUR., Aug. 30, 2004, at 10. See also
Question Remains: Must Employers Rehire Employees Dismissed for Cause?, 27 Disability
Compliance Bull. No. 2, Dec. 24, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Legal News file
(arguing that, because the Supreme Court remanded Raytheon, it did not answer the key
question of "[w]hether the ADA confers preferential rehire rights on employees who are
disabled if they were terminated for violating workplace conduct rules.").
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by or at least related to the disability? Does the public policy favoring
reintegration into the workforce of recovered drug abusers trump the public
policy interest in providing meaningful penalties for the violation of
workplace drug and alcohol regulations? Finally, if no-rehire policies do
have a disparate impact on former alcohol and drug abusers, when (if ever)
can such policies be justified on the basis of workplace safety or business
necessity?
This paper focuses primarily upon the issues involved in disparate
impact claims regarding no-rehire rules because such claims seem more
likely to occur in future challenges to no-rehire policies than disparate
treatment claims." This is so because disparate impact does not require a
showing of intent to discriminate, nor does it require a defendant's
knowledge of a plaintiff's protected class status. Thus, the burden upon the
plaintiff in a disparate impact case is in some respects lighter than in a
disparate treatment case. 12 In the latter, the employer gaffes that would
need to be proven to substantiate a claim are more obvious, and thus more
likely to be avoided by employers. In contrast, a facially neutral no-rehire
rule that has a disparate impact, in other words, a disproportionately
negative effect upon a protected class, may violate the ADA and/or other
anti-discrimination statutes, absent a showing that the rule is a business
necessity for the employer. Employers may be more likely to make the
error of preserving a facially neutral rule that has a negative impact upon
protected groups because they may not weigh the impact of the rule upon
protected classes and they also may not consider whether the rule could be
justified as a business necessity. Nonetheless, the discussion that follows
highlights disparate treatment theory as well as disparate impact in part
11. Christine Neylon O'Brien, Facially Neutral No-Rehire Policies and the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 55 LABOR L.J. 130 (2004). See Elaine W. Shoben, Disparate Impact
Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42
BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598 (2004) (advocating use of disparate impact theory as underutilized
resource for plaintiffs but noting that it "is inherently a class-based theory and class actions
are difficult, if not impossible, for private plaintiffs to undertake unless they involve the
possibility of very large damage awards"). Cf., Nicole J. DeSario, Note, Reconceptualizing
Meritocracy: The Decline of Disparate Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 479, 494-98 (2003) (criticizing the plaintiffs burden of proof in New York City
Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 (1979), a Title VII disparate impact case
where transit applicants and employees who were methadone users were excluded from
employment based on employer policy against use of narcotics where defendant's rule was
presumed to be job related and necessary due to safety and efficiency goals).
12. On the other hand, it may be difficult to succeed on a disparate impact theory where
probative statistical information cannot be easily obtained. In addition, because punitive
damages are not available in disparate impact cases, plaintiffs (and plaintiffs' attorneys)
may be less motivated to pursue expensive litigation. As one author noted, because
disparate impact is "not a heavily litigated theory of discrimination .... many questions
remain relatively unsettled regarding the nature of the plaintiffs proof and the character of
the business necessity defense." Shoben, supra note 11, at 607.
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because of the procedural posture of the case recently presented to the
United States Supreme Court.
I. RAYTHEON CO. v. HERNANDEZ
A. Facts and Judicial History
The United States Supreme Court recently reviewed one employer's
no-rehire rule that was challenged on the ground that it violated the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).13 A brief summary of the facts
and background of the case follows. The plaintiff, Joel Hernandez, had a
history of alcohol abuse and absenteeism, and had previously submitted to
rehabilitation during his twenty-five years of employment at the
employer. 4 He was terminated in 1991 after arriving at work with alcohol
on his breath and a subsequent blood test revealed cocaine in his
bloodstream. 5 Mr. Hernandez reapplied to Raytheon in 1994, submitting a
letter from his Alcoholics Anonymous counselor indicating that he was
sober.' 6 According to the testimony of Ms. Bockmiller, the Raytheon
employee who received the application, the employer allegedly rejected his
application because of the company's unwritten no-rehire rule. 17  She
claimed that she did not look to see the reason for his previous termination
and thus was unaware of the plaintiff's history of drug and alcohol use. 18
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") reviewed
a charge submitted by Hernandez and the subsequent investigation
produced a letter from a George M. Medina, Raytheon's Manager of
Diversity Development, which detailed that the plaintiff s "application was
rejected based on [the plaintiffs] demonstrated drug use while previously
employed and the complete lack of evidence indicating successful drug
rehabilitation. The company maintains it's [sic] right to deny re-
employment to employees terminated for violation of Company rules and
regulations."' 9 Thereafter, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter finding
cause to believe that the employer violated the ADA.20 Armed with this
letter, Hernandez brought suit in the United States District Court for the
13. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). It should be noted that
Hughes Missile System was actually the employer at the time that the cause of action arose
in the case but that Raytheon thereafter acquired Hughes. Id. at 47 n. 1. For simplicity, the
employer will herein be referred to as "Raytheon."
14. Id. at 46-47.
15. Id.
16. Id. at47.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 48.
20. Id. at 48-49.
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District of Arizona.2' There, the trial court granted the employer's motion
for summary judgment.22 It should be noted that in 1999 (during the course
of litigation) the employer had offered the plaintiff a position, but at that
time he was unable to pass the qualifying test.
23
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,
finding that there were genuine issues of material fact.24  The Court of
Appeals noted that whether Hernandez was qualified for the position in
1994 when he first reapplied was critical to the determination of whether
the ADA had been violated. The real reason or basis for the employer's
decision to reject the plaintiffs application was also uncertain. The Ninth
Circuit also analyzed the facts and the application of the purported no-
rehire rule from a perspective that the United States Supreme Court later
concluded was disparate impact rather than treatment.26  The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case to
the Ninth Circuit to apply the appropriate analytical framework, that of
disparate treatment.27
In Raytheon, because of what was essentially a procedural error on the
plaintiff's part, namely the failure to plead the issue of disparate impact in
the first instance, the issue of whether Raytheon's rule had a disparate
impact upon members of the plaintiff's protected class went unanswered by
the Supreme Court.28  However, the Raytheon Court made clear that
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADA.29 The Court also
remanded the case for further consideration of the plaintiffs disparate
treatment claim.3 ° Upon remand, the Ninth Circuit once again found a
sufficient basis to avoid summary judgment for the defendant, and sent the
matter back to the trial court for a jury to decide whether Raytheon refused
to rehire Hernandez because of his past record of addiction rather than
because of a no-rehire rule.3 '
21. Id. at 49.
22. Id.
23. Hernandez v. Raytheon Co., 298 F.3d 1030, 1035 (9th Cir. 2002) (Raytheon 1).
24. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49-50.
25. Raytheon 1, 298 F.3d at 1034.
26. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 53-54.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 49.
29. Id. at 53, citing 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b) (2000). Although the Supreme Court's
statement indicating that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the ADA is
technically dicta since it is not central to the holding in the case, lower courts are unlikely to
take a contrary position given the Court's unequivocal statement and the language of the
statute itself.
30. Id. at 55.
31. Hernandez v. Hughes Missile Sys. Co., 362 F.3d 564, 565, 568 (9th Cir. 2004).
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B. The Raytheon Case Illustrates Disparate Impact and Disparate
Treatment Issues Regarding No-Rehire Policies
How may no-rehire rules have a disparate impact upon the disabled?
Let us look at the rule illustrated in the Raytheon case, for example, to see
how their no-rehire policy could result in a disparate impact upon the
disabled or upon those with a record of disability.32 One problem with
Raytheon's rule is that the individuals banned from rehire include those
who have worked for the company in the past and were terminated for, or
resigned because of, workplace misconduct. Where this misconduct related
to alcohol or drug use, and the former employee is thereafter successfully
rehabilitated and otherwise qualified for employment, the use of a no-rehire
rule to automatically bar re-employment may violate the ADA because of
its disparate impact on those who either have a record of disability or who
remain disabled because of their ongoing problems with addiction. The
disparate impact argument is simply that such a no-rehire rule disparately
impacts those who have been terminated because of misconduct that is a
direct product of the disability and who are now recovered but retain a
record of disability. Where a former employee applies for a position for
which he is qualified, and assuming that the former employee is fully
rehabilitated, should this person at least be entitled to individual
consideration of his application by his former employer? An automatic bar
to re-application would appear to have a disparate impact on members of
the protected class, namely rehabilitated drug or alcohol users who are
otherwise qualified for the job.
Of course, in addition to a disparate impact claim, a disparate
treatment claim could also arise. This is so because generally the employer
will have a record as to why the employee was terminated and this record
will likely substantiate that the employer had knowledge or scienter as to
the former employee's disability or record thereof, thereby establishing one
element of a disparate treatment claim. If an employer has knowledge of
the disability or record, that is the first element in establishing that the
negative employment decision was based upon a discriminatory reason
rather than a purported neutral reason, such as an unwritten no-rehire rule.
Defendant's knowledge that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class is
critical to establishing a discriminatory motive.
In the Raytheon case, the employer maintained that it did not consult
the former employee's full employment record prior to making the decision
32. Raytheon's rule was not in writing, which raised some question as to whether the
rule really existed or was merely asserted as a defensive strategy after the employer's
decision not to rehire was challenged. See Hernandez, 362 F.3d at 569 (noting "jury could
infer from the fact that nobody at Raytheon could identify the origin, history, or scope of the
alleged unwritten policy, that it either did not exist or was not consistently applied.").
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to reject the plaintiff, Joel Hernandez.33 Rather, the initial contact person to
whom the plaintiff applied, Ms. Bockmiller, indicated that she simply
followed the company's no-rehire rule without looking to see what
constituted the cause for the termination.34  Thus, Ms. Bockmiller
maintained that she was unaware of his record of illegal drug use.3"
Nonetheless, Mr. Hernandez submitted a letter from his Alcoholics
Anonymous sponsor along with his job application, and it would be
reasonable for a jury to find that Ms. Bockmiller had access to this.36 In
contrast to this testimony, there was other evidence that in response to the
EEOC charge, another company spokesman, George Medina, wrote that
the complainant's "application was rejected based on his demonstrated
drug use while previously employed and the complete lack of evidence
indicating successful rehabilitation."37  Obviously this kind of factual
conflict works against the employer in that it raises a genuine issue of
material fact.38 As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted upon
remand, such dispute could be a basis for a jury finding that the employer's
policy reason for rejecting Hernandez was a pretext, or a "post-hoc
rationale."39
C. Differentiation Between New Applicants and Former Applicants in
Raytheon
It is noteworthy that Raytheon's no-rehire rule was tougher on former
employees than it was on new applicants. 40 This was so because applicants
who tested positive for illegal drug or alcohol use were permitted to
reapply within a set period of time whereas former employees were totally
banned because of their previous misconduct.41 Again, an argument can be
made that this disparity between classes (applicants vs. re-applicants)
violates the ADA, in particular because the employer has access to the
record of disability with respect to former employees. While employers
may and should set up such disability-related information in separate files
33. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 47.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Hernandez, 362 F.3d at 569.
37. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49.
38. Hernandez, 362 F.3d at 570.
39. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
40. Raytheon 1, 298 F.3d at 1036, n.16.
41. Id. One justification for the harsher treatment of former versus new applicants
could be that former applicants have notice of the consequences of their actions, whereas
new applicants would generally not have such notice. O'Brien, supra note 11, at 138.
Stated differently, the complete ban on rehire would serve to deter workplace misconduct by
providing a severe penalty; this consideration is not present for those who are not currently
employees.
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from an employee's work record,42 they nonetheless could have access to
both sets of records. In this modern technological age, if such records are
computerized, it is readily discoverable what records have been accessed at
a particular time.
No-rehire rules that bar re-application would seem to bar future
employment opportunities for former employees in a way in which new
applicants are not similarly limited. Does it make sense for employers to
set higher hurdles for former employees than for new applicants? In the
Raytheon case, new applicants with drug or alcohol problems were treated
less harshly than former employees who reapplied for employment. Some
disabilities, by nature, may lift, dissipate, or essentially become corrected
after the individual's departure from employment. Thus, the former
applicant may be a better choice for the employer than the new applicant
who currently has a problem, and yet policies that bar former employees
prevent individualized consideration of former applicants' present
condition.
1I. WHAT IS THE LAW REGARDING ALCOHOL AND DRUGS IN THE
WORKPLACE?
A. Statutory Objectives
There is a clear tension - or one might more optimistically describe it
as a careful balance - in the ADA between the twin objectives of (1) taking
a firm stand against the current abuse of alcohol and drugs, and (2)
promoting the reintegration into the workforce of those who are no longer
engaged in the illegal use of drugs.43 Section 12114(a), for example,
specifically excludes from the definition of "qualified individual with a
disability.., any employee or applicant who is currently engaging in the
illegal use of drugs." 4 Section 12114(b) then clarifies that individuals who
42. Title I of the ADA requires the separation of medical-related information from the
personnel files of all applicants and employees. See Stephen S. Pennington & Jamie C. Ray,
9th Circuit Lets Jury Decide Hernandez, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 25, 2004, at 6 (citing
EEOC Technical Assistance Manual on the Employment Provisions [Title I] of the ADA,
Section 6.5).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 12114 (2000).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted the phrase "not
currently engaged" to mean that the person has been in recovery long enough to become
stable. McDaniel v. Mississippi Baptist Med. Ctr., 877 F. Supp. 321, 327-28 (S.D. Miss.
1994), aft'd, 74 F.3d 1238 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). The exact amount
of time that must pass is not clear. See, e.g., Herman v. City of Allentown, 985 F. Supp.
569, 578-79 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that nine months is sufficient); Montegue v. City of
New Orleans, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13795, at *10 (E.D. La. 1996) (finding that more than
one year is sufficient); Baustian v. Louisiana, 910 F. Supp. 274, 277 (E.D. La. 1995)
(holding that seven weeks is insufficient).
2004]
166 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 7:1
are no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, and who are
participating in or have completed a drug rehabilitation program are not
necessarily excluded from the definition of "qualified individual with a
disability., 45 The ADA furthermore explicitly states that employers:
(1) may prohibit the illegal use of drugs and the use of alcohol at
the workplace by all employees;
(2) may require that employees shall not be under the influence
of alcohol or be engaging in the illegal use of drugs at the
workplace;
(3) may hold an employee who engages in the illegal use of drugs
or who is an alcoholic to the same qualification standards for
employment or job performance and behavior that such entity
holds other employees, even if any unsatisfactory performance
or behavior is related to the drug use or alcoholism of such
employee.46
This is the only reference to disability-caused misconduct contained in
the ADA47 and signifies congressional intent to treat drug and alcohol
addiction differently from other disabilities.48 Because no-rehire rules are
frequently applied to individuals who have been discharged for
misconduct, this special treatment in the statute may make it more likely
that no-rehire rules will be upheld in the context of drug and alcohol abuse.
B. Are Alcoholism and Drug Addiction "Disabilities" Under the ADA?
As a preliminary matter, one might wonder whether alcohol and drug
addiction are even considered disabilities under the ADA. After all, section
12114 merely states that recovered or recovering drug users are not
necessarily excluded from the definition of "qualified individual with a
disability. 49  It does not affirmatively state that such individuals are
"qualified individuals with a disability."'5 In Raytheon, the parties did not
dispute that Hernandez was disabled,5 and so the Supreme Court did not
explicitly address the issue. Nevertheless, it appears clear that the courts
will generally consider alcoholism and past drug addiction a disability
45. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(c) (emphasis added).
47. Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997).
48. Walsted v. Woodbury County, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1342 (N.D. Iowa 2000).
49. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b).
50. Id.
51. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 50 n.4.
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under the ADA,52 particularly in light of Raytheon.53 This is not to say that
alcoholism or past drug addiction are per se disabilities, however. 4 The
determination as to whether a plaintiff is disabled is based on whether the
alleged disability affects her ability to perform a major life activity, a
determination which requires "an individualized inquiry." 55
C. What is Reasonable Accommodation?
The distinction between a person's condition and its classification as a
"disability" under the ADA is especially relevant in the context of a
reasonable accommodation claim. This is because the ADA requires
employers to reasonably accommodate limitations, not disabilities.56 That
is to say, disabled individuals should be presumed to not have job-related
limitations unless there is reason to believe otherwise. This presumption is
firmly rooted in the same public policy that led to the passage of the ADA
in the first place, namely, that disabled individuals are in many cases just as
able as their non-disabled counterparts to be productive in the workplace.
57
During oral argument in the Raytheon case, Hernandez' lawyer
suggested that Raytheon's no-rehire rule should have been relaxed as a
reasonable accommodation to Hernandez during the re-application
process.58 Justices Scalia and O'Connor seemed critical of this position:
52. E.g., Brown v. Lucky Stores, 246 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 2001) ("alcoholism is a
protected disability under the ADA"); Renaud v. Wyoming Dep't of Family Servs., 203
F.3d 723, 730 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000) (listing authorities and noting that whether alcoholism is
a per se disability may raise additional issues); Peyton v. Otis Elevator Co., 72 F. Supp. 2d
915, 919 (N.D. Ill. 1999) ("alcoholism is a presumed disability for ADA purposes"); Flynn
v. Raytheon, 868 F. Supp. 383, 385 (D. Mass. 1994) ("[Plaintiff] asserts correctly that, as an
alcoholic, he is a disabled individual under the Americans with Disabilities Act."); State v.
Jackson, 812 N.E.2d 1002, 1004 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) ("We also agree that the term
'handicap' or 'disability' is defined in the ADA to include drug addiction and alcoholism.").
53. Shaina Walter, ADA: Supreme Court Disallows Disparate Impact Analysis of
Facially Valid Employment Procedures, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHics 373, 374 (2004).
54. Sullivan v. Neiman Marcus Group, 358 F.3d 110, 114-15 (1st Cir. 2004); Burch v.
Coca-Cola Co., 119 F.3d 305, 314-16 (5th Cir. 1997).
55. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 472, 483 (1999). See also Albertson's
Inc. v. Hallie Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566 (1999) (noting that there is a "statutory
obligation to determine the existence of disabilities on a case-by-case basis"); Sullivan, 358
F.3d at 115 (describing an employee's Catch-22 situation, in which he was attempting to
prove he was disabled or regarded as disabled under the ADA by demonstrating that his
ability to work was substantially impaired, but realizing that this evidence might also
demonstrate that he was unqualified and thus not entitled to protection of the ADA).
56. Taylor v. Principal Fin. Group, 93 F.3d 155, 164 (5th Cir. 1996).
57. Id.
58. Oral Argument of Stephen G. Montoya on Behalf of the Respondent at 34-37,
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (No. 02-749).
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QUESTION: What disability would you be accommodating?
HERNANDEZ'S LAWYER: You would be accommodating the
disability of disabling addiction to drugs and alcohol.
QUESTION: He doesn't have that disability ....
HERNANDEZ'S LAWYER: [U]nder the definition of disability
set forth by the ADA, Justice Scalia, someone with a record of
a disability is in fact disabled under the statute.
QUESTION: He is in fact disabled, but-but what-what
disability of his are you accommodating?
59
The Justices' comments highlight the difficulty a plaintiff would face
in challenging a no-rehire rule on the grounds that he is no longer engaged
in the illegal use of drugs. Hernandez claimed - as he had to claim60 - that
he was no longer engaging in the illegal use of drugs, and that he was
"clean and sober."'6' There is no question that someone who has a record of
a disability is "disabled" for purposes of the ADA.62 However, because
limitations, but not disabilities, must be reasonably accommodated, it is not
clear how a plaintiff in Hernandez's situation could ever succeed on a
reasonable accommodation theory. What job-related limitations might a
former drug addict or alcoholic have? Not surprisingly, courts have
suggested that failure-to-rehire claims are not properly viewed in the
framework of reasonable accommodation.63
D. Leaves of Absence and Last Chance Agreements
Where an individual suffers relapse of addiction, a leave of absence
for rehabilitation is a useful accommodation, but at some point an employer
may decide that repeating such an accommodation is too much of a burden
on the business.6' In the context of safety concerns or even in the interest
59. Id.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a) (2000).
61. Hernandez, 362 F.3d at 566 (9th Cir. 2004).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2).
63. Peyton, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 921; Siefken v. Village of Arlington Heights, 65 F.3d 664,
666 (7th Cir. 1995) ("'A second chance.' . . . is not an accommodation, as envisioned in the
ADA.").
64. It has been noted that a reasonable accommodation for alcoholics would be to allow
the alcoholic a leave from work to complete a rehabilitation program. See Beverly W.
Garofalo & Nicole Anker, Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Under the ADA, CORP.
COUNSELLOR, Mar. 23, 2004 at 1 (noting the EEOC recommends that providing a leave of
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of maintaining the quality of its products, an employer could argue that
employing individuals who have previously and repeatedly proven
themselves unreliable in terms of sobriety on the job is foolhardy,
irresponsible, inefficient, and unprofitable.65
Should an employer be forced to reconsider those who have been
terminated because of misconduct, even if the misconduct is related to a
recognized disability? The statute and the courts have made clear that
employers can hold employees with addictions to the same standards of
workplace conduct as employees without addictions.66  Progressive
discipline and discharge policies for misconduct are a standard method of
maintaining safety and order in the workplace. Where an employer
thoughtfully fashions such policies, as well as uniformly and fairly applies
them to all employees, it is likely that the policies will withstand most legal
challenges.
So what hope is there for recidivist employees to avoid the fatal and
final impediment of an employer's facially neutral no-rehire rule? Several
avenues may be helpful. First, an employee who is on the verge of
discharge might request a leave of absence along with a last chance
agreement ("LCA"). A LCA is illustrated in Longen v. Waterous
67Company. The Longen case involved an employee with ongoing
substance abuse problems who had entered chemical dependency treatment
five times in three years during his employment with the defendant. 68 In
upholding the district court's summary judgment for the employer, the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that "courts have consistently
found no disability discrimination in discharges pursuant to such
agreements" because by their nature, these return to work agreements
impose different employment conditions.69 In Longen, the plaintiff was
given multiple LCAs, the last of which prohibited future use of mood
absence to an alcoholic employee is a reasonable accommodation and also advocating the
use of last chance agreements for employees who are found to be under the influence at
work, providing the employee the opportunity to obtain treatment in the context of a signed
agreement that any further violations will result in termination).
65. See Jacquelyn Lynn, Management Smarts, Just Say No, ENTREPRENEUR, Dec. 1997,
at 36 (arguing that hiring a substance abuser results in loss of productivity, and increases in
absenteeism, medical claims, pilferage, and accidents and workers' compensation claims).
66. See Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635, 636-37 (7th Cir. 1995) (involving
alcoholic employee's demotion due to lost license resulting from DUI, where court noted it
is not "a reasonably required accommodation to overlook infractions of the law."); O'Brien,
supra note 11, at 136 (discussing Harris v. Polk, 103 F.3d 696, 697 (8th Cir. 1996), and
finding that the "employer may hold disabled employees to the same standard of law-
abiding conduct as all other applicants").
67. 347 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 2003).
68. Id. at 687.
69. Id. at 689.
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altering chemicals including alcohol. 70  The plaintiff was thereafter
terminated because of a DUI committed while on a leave due to a workers'
compensation injury." Plaintiff Longen objected to the restriction of
alcohol use that extended beyond the workplace but the court of appeals
noted that he had agreed to such restrictions on his conduct in order to
continue working at the defendant employer and found that the plaintiff
failed to show that the ADA forbids such agreements.72
E. Making a Case Based on Disparate Impact Theory
Another avenue that may be available for terminated addicts to avoid
the barrier of a facially neutral no-rehire rule is through a lawsuit based
upon a disparate impact claim. The plaintiff must prove statistically that
former addicts and recovered alcoholics are disproportionately
disadvantaged or prevented from consideration for re-employment, and
then if the employer is unable to establish the business necessity of the no-
rehire rule, because the no-rehire policy is not truly necessary to the
business, then a plaintiff could argue that he should be given relief in the
form of individualized consideration of his qualifications and readiness to
return to work. In some cases, a return to work agreement would contain a
last chance agreement and such could balance the needs of both parties.
The disparate impact portion of this approach could be established
with statistics showing that significantly more rehabilitated drug and
alcohol abusers would be excluded by such policies than employees who
are not so afflicted. For example, a plaintiff might put forth the following
statistics. A company employs 10,000 people, eight percent of whom are
alcoholics or drug abusers and ninety-two percent of whom are not.73 Two
hundred people are fired for misconduct, 160 of whom are discharged for
misconduct not related to being an alcoholic or drug user and forty of
whom are discharged for misconduct that is so related. Finally, fifty of
those 200 reapply and are rejected based on a no-rehire rule, fourteen of
whom are recovered alcoholics or former drug users and thirty-six of whom
are not.
These figures could be used to illustrate disparate impact. A court
may view critically the fact that twenty-eight percent (14/50) of those
70. Id. at 687.
71. Id. at 687-88.
72. Id. at 689.
73. This statistic may be difficult to ascertain; in that case a plaintiff's best course of
action may be to present statistics showing alcohol and drug abuse rates in the general
population, or statistics illustrating higher misconduct rates for alcoholics and drug abusers.
Of course, the ideal statistic would simply be one indicating a higher rate of misconduct-
related discharge for alcoholics and drug abusers than for those who do not fall into either of
these categories.
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denied re-employment based on the no-rehire rule are recovered alcoholics
or former drug abusers, when only eight percent of the overall workforce
and twenty percent (40/200) of those discharged for misconduct fall into
these categories. As a practical matter, it may be that none or very few of
those discharged ever apply for rehire due to the perceived futility of doing
so based on the no-rehire rule itself, rendering statistics regarding those
actually denied rehire unavailable. This need not be fatal to a plaintiff's
case, however. It should be enough to show that alcoholics and drug
abusers are substantially more likely to be discharged for misconduct - and
therefore ineligible for rehire - than non-alcoholics/drug abusers. In the
present hypothetical, these figures would be five percent (40/800) and 1.7%
(160/9,200), suggesting that alcoholics and drug abusers are around three
times more likely (5%/1.7%) to be discharged for misconduct than those
who are not alcoholics or drugs abusers.74
III. CONCLUSION
The preceding analysis of the current state of the law provides
guidance for both employers and employees when dealing with misconduct
related to alcohol and drug abuse in the presence of a neutral no-rehire rule.
Employees should be aware that the use of alcohol in the workplace need
not be accommodated by employers, even where such employee is an
alcoholic and would be considered disabled under the ADA. Similarly,
current illegal drug users are specifically excluded from ADA protection.
Employees who are alcoholics and seek to overcome this condition should
request a leave of absence from the employer as a reasonable
accommodation. 75 The request should occur prior to any conduct violation
in order to avoid being excluded from ADA protection based on section
12114(c).
Employers desiring to maintain their neutral no-rehire policies should
be certain that such policies are written and unambiguous in order to avoid
raising an issue of fact as to whether the policy actually exists.
Furthermore, employers should be sure to apply the policy in a consistent
manner, since selective enforcement of a no-rehire rule could constitute
disparate treatment.76 On the other hand, consistently applying a no-rehire
policy may open the door to a disparate impact claim. To lessen the
74. Once disparate impact is shown, employers may still be able to successfully defend
by showing that the no-rehire rule is consistent with business necessity. Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
75. Brown v. Lucky Stores Inc., 246 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001) (acknowledging
that "the general rule [is] that an employee must make an initial request [for
accommodation]").
76. Flynn v. Raytheon, 868 F. Supp. 383, 388 (D. Mass. 1994).
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possibility of such a claim, employers desiring to make exceptions to the
no-rehire rule should document the decision process, being careful to not
make adverse employment decisions on the basis of a protected
characteristic. 77  Finally, last chance agreements may be the favored
mechanism for both employers and employees to deal with alcohol and
drug-related misconduct issues. On the one hand, employers can be
reasonably confident that termination based on violation of a last chance
agreement will be upheld by a court. Equally important, last chance
agreements provide clear notice to employees on the consequences of their
actions and, if properly crafted, can assist the employee in remaining
employed while protecting the legitimate safety and business interests of
the employer.
77. Garofalo & Anker, supra note 64.
